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CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS TO EQUAL PROTECTION IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Historically, the Supreme Court has required a showing of particularized harm to prove an equal protection violation. For example, in
McCleskey v. Kemp,' the Supreme Court found no equal protection
violation 2 despite statistical studies showing that defendants charged
with killing white victims were four times more likely to be sentenced
to death than those charged with killing black victims. 3 The Court

reasoned that these statistics did not demonstrate that racial considerations had played a role in McCleskey's particular sentence. 4 Although
the requirement of particularized harm is consistent with the traditional common law view of causation, it necessarily causes courts to
neglect more subtle, systemic risks created by the operation of government. Often a criminal defendant cannot identify a specific
wrongdoer, nor can he prove that racial discrimination more likely
Sometimes, as in
than not tainted his particular conviction.5
McCleskey, all that a defendant can show is that, after multipleregression analyses have accounted for plausible non-racial explanations, disparities still remain.
The requirement of particularized harm is of special concern in
equal protection cases today as social mores have largely driven racial
animus underground, making discrimination far more likely to occur
surreptitiously. 6 This problem is exacerbated in the criminal justice

context, in which government actors often wield vast amounts of discretion - discretion that allows those who discriminate to mask their
1 481 U.S.

279 (1987).

2 Id. at 299.
3

See id.

4 See id. at 294-95, 297.
5 See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough Antidiscrimination
Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (978) (noting
the "impossible burden of isolating the particular conditions of discrimination produced by and
mechanically linked to the behavior of an identified blameworthy perpetrator"); cf. Herskovits v.
Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash. I983) (addressing the causation
problems when a doctor's negligent diagnosis reduced a cancer patient's chance of survival); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Cal. 198o) (addressing the claims of a plaintiff who
was unable to identify precisely which pharmaceutical company manufactured a defective drug).
6 Some commentators additionally, albeit controversially, suggest that racism can exist unconsciously, caused by a lack of empathy. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 TermForeword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 9o HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1976) (describing the problem of "racially selective indifference"); Charles R. Lawrence HI, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44
(1987). But cf, e.g., Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing "cronyism" from racism in a Title VH action because, although selecting one's friends may
result in numerical disparities, "it is not the same kind of iniquity as racial discrimination").
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impermissible motives.7 Ironically, the harm that particularized inquiries are thus most likely to overlook is one that is especially damaging to the legitimacy of the law: systemic racial discrimination in the
administration of criminal justice.
This Note examines the reasons for and the ramifications of a new
equal protection perspective that would recognize not only traditional
particularized harms, but also risks - uncertain, probabilistic representations of traditional harms.8 Rather than ignoring risk as an unremediable possibility of harm, the new paradigm would view risk as a
harm in itself.9 A constitutional risk perspective would not necessarily
change any underlying values or normative goals of the legal system,
but it would enhance the law's ability to recognize a set of harms hidden by the current paradigm of particularity. It would allow a reassessment of "the legal significance of discrete, isolated decisions that
are susceptible to a non-racial explanation when considered individually, but reveal a pattern clearly shaped by racial sentiment when con10
sidered en masse."
Part I summarizes the traditional requirement of particularity: its
underlying reasons, its costs, and its effect on racial discrimination
claims related to sentencing, prosecution, and policing. A brief examination reveals that the particularity requirement unnecessarily causes
courts to ignore statistical data and to fail to remedy systemic discrimination. Part II conceptualizes a regime of constitutional risk and
addresses the difficult problem of providing an appropriate remedy. In
a regime that recognized risks as harms, defendants could make claims
for less than certain, probabilistic harms, so delineating proper remedies would therefore be crucial to prevent a collapse of the system.
Part II argues that guidelines for the exercise of discretion may create
the right balance between security against discrimination and practical
flexibility. Part III discusses the possibilities for a constitutional risk
regime and suggests areas for further research.

7

See infra note i o.

8 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn

from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. i, 12 (x989) (advocating a shift in state action doctrine
from a Newtonian world view focused on "isolated forces acting on particular individuals" to a
post-Newtonian, relativistic view focused on individuals' interactions with the entire fabric of a
system).
9 Cf. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 48! (Pearson, J., concurring) (suggesting that the "injury" caused
by a doctor's negligent diagnosis could be defined as the decreased chance of surviving cancer).
10 Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, iox HARV. L. REV. 1388, 14o6 (1988).
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I. THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT

Equal protection doctrine generally requires both a particularized
actor and a particularized harm: a litigant must prove not only that a
government actor was motivated by a discriminatory purpose,' 1 but2
also that the discriminatory act affected the outcome of his case.'
The Court has adhered rigidly to these particularity requirements, inducing some commentators to describe the doctrine as limiting equal
protection violations only to cases in which a government official is
"out to get" an individual based on impermissible grounds.' 3 Except
in a few select areas, 14 statistical evidence rarely furnishes a basis for a
successful equal protection claim.' 5
A. The Reasons for Particularity
The reluctance of courts to grant relief based on statistical showings of inexplicable racial disparities is not without reasonable basis.
The requirement of particularity is closely linked to traditional Enlightenment notions of moral responsibility and free will, and a rush to
embrace statistical data could significantly compromise these widely
held values. In addition, statistical analyses can be plagued with subtle technical flaws that are difficult to detect. When courts face these
concerns as well as the problems of remedy discussed in Part II they
are understandably hesitant.
i. Moral Responsibility and Free Will. - The requirement of particularity is not surprising in light of common law causation principles,

11See,

e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
12 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 48! U.S. 279, 292 (1987); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984) (holding that standing requires "personal injury fairly traceable to the [wrongdoer's]
allegedly unlawful conduct"); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE

OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 117 (iggg) (criticizing the McCleskey Court for having introduced this

new standard in discrimination cases).
13 E.g., Kennedy, supra note io, at 1405 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (x977) (grand jury); Swann v. Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 24-25 (x971) (school desegregation); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1119-34 (1989) (arguing that
in jury selection, voting, and education cases, the intent requirement is significantly attenuated).
15 The Supreme Court typically accepts statistical evidence only when a law's application is so
racially disparate that the numbers permit the inference of discriminatory intent. For example, in

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (196o), the Court found unconstitutional a twenty-eight-sided
voting district that redistricted all but four or five of 400 black voters, but no white voters. Id. at
341; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (x886) (finding an equal protection violation
when city supervisors denied permits to two hundred Chinese laundries while granting permits to
eighty non-Chinese laundries).
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which are binary or mechanistic,1 6 rather than probabilistic. 7 These
principles arise from a Newtonian perspective - every action arises
through the will of a free moral actor' 8 - and accord with traditional
notions of moral responsibility in the law' 9 and the structure of private
law litigation. 20 Thus, just as tort law requires a plaintiff to show that
the defendant more likely than not caused his injury, constitutional
law requires a party to show that a government actor's racial animus
more likely than not changed the outcome of the case. This understanding of causation creates particularity requirements along two
closely related veins: First, the law seeks to blame a specific actor, not
societal conditions or the system in general. Second, the law requires
that the actor have actually harmed the particular defendant.
The requirement of a particularized wrongdoer manifests itself in
the equal protection requirement of purposeful discrimination and in
the rejection of statistical proof of harm when a claimant cannot identify a specific wrongdoer. 21 For example, in McCleskey the Court cited
jury uniqueness in denying McCleskey's claim. 22 Because the jury
acted only once, no consistent pattern of racism could be imputed to
it.23
From the standpoint of individual responsibility, this conclusion
makes logical sense - a single point, per se, cannot form a pattern.
The systemic result, however, is that discriminatory decisionmakers go
undetected, and structural safeguards that could prevent or impede
racist decisionmaking are not considered.
The focus on actual harm to the particular defendant bars recovery
when statistical studies can demonstrate only a risk of discrimination,
not actual discrimination. 24 This doctrinal rule has normative and
practical support. Normatively, denying recovery in the absence of ac-

16 See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORI,, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 64-71 (2d ed. 1985);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870--96o: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 52-57 (1992).
17 Indeed, even if an act or occurrence can be shown to be more probable than not, under traditional causation principles such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient for recovery. See David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984).
18 See Tribe, supra note 8, at 5-7 (describing Newtonian mechanics).
19 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1285 (1976) (noting that intention and fault formed the foundation of the traditional private law
system); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 858.
20 See Chayes, supra note ig, at 1282-83 (describing private law litigation as bipolar and as
involving self-contained episodes confined to discrete parties).
21 Cf. Freeman, supra note 5, at 1052-57 (describing this "perpetrator perspective" that causes
courts to "view[] racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided
conduct of particular actors").
22 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987).
23
24

See id. at
See id. at

295
291

n.i5.
n.7.
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tual harm forgives transgressions in which no evil results 25 - "no
harm, no foul." Practically, compensating every risk that government
action imposes would involve enormous transaction costs and measurement difficulties and might well lead to an excessive level of rights
enforcement and an overly cautious society. 26 Every government action theoretically harbors some risk of discrimination; to compensate
for all such risks would be unmanageable, if not impossible. 7
The response to these arguments is two-fold. First, it is possible to
distinguish between individual actors and the government. Forgiveness is less normatively appealing when applied to the government,
especially because racial discrimination seriously undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Second, the practical difficulties of compensating all risks do not require courts to compensate no
risks. By compensating some subset of "substantial" risks delineated
28
as a matter of policy, the law can avoid the slippery slope.
2. Flawed Statistical Regressions. From a practical standpoint,
courts may be reluctant to open equal protection doctrine to statistical
proof for technical reasons. 29 One of the most significant criticisms of
statistical studies on discrimination is the inability of multiple regressions to account for all race-neutral explanations for racial disparities.
Statistically, some crimes or behaviors may be more prevalent among
members of certain minority groups; thus statistics showing disproportionate sentencing, prosecution, or policing may not reflect any discrimination at all.30 Although regressions account for many raceneutral explanations and are thus more sophisticated than the raw
numerical comparisons featured in disparate impact arguments, 3 1 re25

See Rosenberg, supra note

17,

at 882-83.

26 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 76-77 (1974).

27 These concerns probably underlie the well accepted tort doctrine that one cannot recover
for "negligence in the air" (a negligent act that results in no injury). See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., x62 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). See generally HORWITZ, supra note
z6, at 56 (discussing the "negligence in the air" doctrine). Similarly, the infeasibility of awarding
reversal for any de minimis trial mistake probably underlies the harmless error doctrine.
28 See infra note 79. For a discussion of slippery slopes and the problem of line drawing, see
Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).
29 The methods by which judges and juries handle statistical and probabilistic evidence would
obviously be critical to the successful implementation of a constitutional risk perspective. A general discourse on these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the
advantages of statistical data over experts' judgments, see William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein,
Statistics, Not Experts (Feb. 11, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
30 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (i996) (implying that different racial
groups commit crimes with varying degrees of frequency); cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (rejecting the "assumption that minorities will choose a particular
trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population").
31 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Multipleregression analysis is particularly well suited to identify the influence of impermissible considera-
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gressions can never be perfect, and some race-neutral factors may be
omitted due to a lack of data.32 Historically, courts have cited preas a reason to disregard statistical showcisely this possible omission
33
ings of racial disparity.
This concern may be valid, but surely parties must do more than
speculate about possible flaws to invalidate statistical evidence. The
key question is whether the omission of potentially explanatory factors
creates sufficient doubt in a study's accuracy to warrant the denial of
all relief. Although the omission of variables may affect the probative
value of a regression, it should not always render a study entirely inadmissible as evidence of discrimination. 34 As some statisticians suggest, courts need to consider just how significant a permissible "unknown" factor would have to be to account for the racial disparities
observed. 3 s For example, although there may be a five to one racial
disparity in traffic stops, it is improbable that blacks are five times
36
more likely to speed or to drive with a broken tail light than whites.
The other major problem with using statistical data in the equal
protection context is the question of class definition: how one defines
one's statistical sample can affect the results of a study. For example,
there may be a racial disparity among murder sentences throughout a
state, yet there may be no such disparity in a particular county.
Courts do, however, face similar problems in mass-tort class actions as

tions in sentencing, since it is able to control for permissible factors that may explain an apparently arbitrary pattern.").
32 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 627-33 (x998) (discussing a method to account for correlations
between non-racial factors and race and suggesting that collecting data on nonprosecutions is notoriously difficult).
33 E.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470 (citing a lack of evidence regarding "similarly situated persons" of other races); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.14 (distinguishing death penalty cases in which
there is "no common standard by which to evaluate all defendants" from jury venire selection
cases in which the number of factors is purportedly limited and, "to a great degree, objectively
verifiable"); Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 56o, 562 (Ga. 1995) (finding statistical evidence insufficient and criticizing the potential omission of other race-neutral explanatory factors).
34 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
3S See Joseph L. Gastwirth & Tapan K. Nayak, Statistical Aspects of Cases Concerning Racial
Discrimination in Drug Sentencing: Stephens v. State and U.S. v. Armstrong, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 583, 590-96 (1997) (suggesting a statistical technique to make this determination).
Professor McAdams has made the related suggestion that, when relevant data is unavailable, trial
courts should fill in "data gaps" with reasonable assumptions. See McAdams, supra note 32, at
634-40. For example, although numerical data may not exist on the number of nonblack drivers
who speed, it is reasonable to assume that at least some do. See id. at 632, 637.
36 But see United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the defendant's
claim of discriminatory enforcement of a bicycle headlamp law because, even if the law was enforced solely against blacks, the defendant failed to show that whites rode bicycles in violation of
the statute).
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well as in statutory discrimination actions, which suggests that this
37
difficulty is manageable.
B. Costs
As already noted, the particularity requirement and its rejection of
statistical evidence have substantial costs. The Court's cramped view
of constitutional harm forces courts to examine only individual cases,
38
which cannot reveal or redress patterns of racial discrimination.
Considered in isolation, nearly all decisions can be rationalized using
permissible explanations; it is only when these decisions are considered
in the aggregate that patterns may emerge that indicate the presence of
impermissible discrimination.3 9 As a result, the particularity requirement obscures the discriminatory decisions of government actors, making their already broad discretion effectively unreviewable.
It is true that overt discrimination is readily detectable under the
traditional particularized harm framework. If a judge overtly relies on
race in sentencing defendants to death, or if police departments target
motorists because of their race, the discrimination is plain. But the
particularized framework, though perhaps effective in past "conquests"40 of overt discrimination, is wholly inadequate in a contemporary society in which "discrimination takes a form more subtle than
before." 4 1 Contemporary mores and legal pressures have altered the
appearance of racism. Gone are facially discriminatory statutes and
prosecution policies. In their place has arisen a racism cloaked in nonracial explanations.4 2 Thus, despite a facially neutral statute and the
absence of an overtly discriminatory enforcement policy, regression
37 See, e.g., Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (4 th Cir. 1993) (defining the
class in a Title VII disparate impact action as the available pool of workers).
38 Cf Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1372 & n.i (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that,
in the ex post facto context, a court must examine the effect of a rule change on the class of defendants rather than on the particular defendant because the combination of rules and discretion
involved in sentencing precludes ever proving harm in the individual case); JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 44 (1987) (suggesting that, in the scientific context, looking
analytically at individual pieces reveals little about global interactions or changes); Rosenberg,
supra note 17, at 885 n.141 (suggesting that, in the tort context, case-by-case adjudication often
overlooks aggregate or systemic problems).
39 Cf. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, z98z Term-Foreword:Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 (I982) (noting that "statistics on employment decisions
that by themselves appear neutral or nonprobative may take on a different meaning when seen in
the context of the company's overall employment activities").
40 Kennedy, supra note io, at 1419.
41 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979); id. ("But [the discrimination] is not less real or
pernicious."); see Kennedy, supra note io, at 1419 (discussing how the purposeful discrimination
requirement "ignores the chameleonlike ability of prejudice to adapt unobtrusively to new surroundings").
42 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2o, at 159o (2d
ed. 1988) (observing that finding a "bigoted decision-maker" can be difficult).
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analysis may still show that, even after accounting for all relevant nonracial factors, minorities are more likely to be arrested, convicted, or
sentenced more harshly. The particularity requirement, however, renders courts incapable of recognizing such risk-based harm.
The broad discretion traditionally afforded government actors in
investigating, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing defendants exacerbates the cloaking phenomenon. 43 Although some discretion is inevitable because of the resource allocation and complex balancing questions involved, 44 broad discretion facilitates the masking of
impermissible motives. Together with the judicial deference that usufosters an environment acutely
ally accompanies it, such discretion
45
susceptible to discrimination.
Moreover, the failure to recognize statistical evidence and constitutional risks of discrimination legitimizes government structures and
practices and thereby inhibits not only courts, but also legislatures
from examining them. 46 By denying the existence of discrimination altogether, courts absolve other "governmental and nongovernmental actors of responsibility for solving these problems" through alternative
avenues. 47 The inability to remedy a harm does not justify the refusal
to acknowledge its existence. 48 Finally, because requiring particularized harm will almost always result in a finding of nondiscrimination,
courts can theoretically manipulate the required level of particularity
to mask ideological preferences for or against greater equal protection. 49
43 See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REv.

(x98s) (discussing how prosecutors have gained discretion while other actors such
as magistrates, parole boards, and correctional officials have been constrained); infra note 1u5.
44 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (i985) (suggesting that prosecutorial discretion is
necessary because of resource limitations and because of the "systemic costs" of judicial supervision, which include chilling law enforcement by scrutinizing prosecutorial motives and undermining prosecutorial effectiveness by "revealing the Government's enforcement policy").
45 See infra note Iio.
46 See Kennedy, supra note io, at I46.
47 Tribe, supra note 8, at 34; see id. at 33-34 (criticizing McCleskey on this ground); cf id. at 30
(arguing that, in a school desegregation case, even if the Court "would have had no impact on judicial remedies, a judicial proclamation that inner city ghettoization was constitutionally infirm
might have avoided legitimating this nationwide travesty').
48 See id. at 38 (explaining that modernism teaches that "we can see more than we can do,"
but that "this does not mean that we should lie about what we see").
49 Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of
manipulating standing to disguise a decision on the merits); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 428-35 (1999) (describing the use of deterrence-based arguments as a rhetorical strategy to pacify debates and to mask ideological preferences).
This observation does not mean that courts regularly use doctrinal manipulations to achieve
desired substantive outcomes, but the threat that courts might do so nonetheless exists. For example, a skeptical observer of ex post facto doctrine could suggest that the Court has manipulated
the required level of particularity to make relief more difficult to obtain: when particularized
harm is easier to prove, the Court requires general systemic harm; when general systemic harm is
1521, 15211-22
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C. Effects
A brief survey of equal protection doctrine in sentencing, prosecution, and policing evinces the pervasive culture of particularity and its
consequences. Courts have generally declined to award relief on the
basis of statistical racial disparities, focusing instead on the particular
facts of each case.
z. Sentencing. - Despite various studies showing racial disparities
in sentencing, 0 the bottom line is simple: no court has ever found an
equal protection violation on the basis of racial disparities."1 Although
the reasons for this stark result are complex, the principal decisions
leave little doubt that the particularity requirement has played a critical role. For example, in McCleskey, although the Court assumed the
validity of the statistical studies arguendo 2 - thus allowing the discussion to venture beyond surface-level empirical debates - it still denied relief, focusing on the particulars of McCleskey's case. According
to the Court, McCleskey could not claim discrimination because he
was indeed guilty as charged - he had "committed an act for which
the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of
the death penalty."5 3 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the
corollary of the purposeful discrimination requirement of Washington

easier to prove, the Court requires particularized harm. Compare Seling v. Young, 121 S. Ct. 727,
734-35 (2oox) (requiring that "punitiveness" for ex post facto purposes be determined facially that is, systemically - and finding that the defendant's particularized showing was insufficient),
with Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1370 (2000) (requiring a claimant to "show that as applied
to his own sentence the law created a significant risk of increasing his punishment").
50 See generally David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner &
Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-FurmanEra:An Empiricaland Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638,
1658-62 (1998) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (iggo), which surveyed twentyeight statistical studies and found strong evidence of race-of-the-victim discrimination but
equivocal evidence of race-of-the-defendant discrimination); id. at 1676-1710 (discussing capital
sentencing disparities in Philadelphia from 2983 to 2993).
s1 See Kennedy, supra note io, at 1402 ("[A]s far as reported cases disclose, no defendant in
state or federal court has ever successfully challenged his punishment on grounds of racial discrimination in sentencing." (emphasis omitted)).
S2 McCleskey v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 292 n.7 (1987). The empirical validity of racial disparities in sentencing has been a matter of ongoing controversy, but suspicions of racial discrimination
in capital sentencing are not new. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (2972), several Justices,
including the dissenting Chief Justice Burger, all expressed concerns about racial discrimination in
capital cases. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (blaming standardless statutes for the discriminatory imposition of the death penalty); id. at 3io (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]f any basis
can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race."); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that, "while the higher
rate of execution among [blacks] is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of discrimination"); id. at 389 n.I 2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging disparities).
S3 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
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v. Davis5 4 was that "a criminal defendant must prove that the purposeful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him." 5
McCleskey had "offer[ed] no evidence specific to his own case that
would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in
his sentence,"' 6 and thus was not entitled to relief.
The McCleskey Court thus manifested a legal consciousness narrowly focused on particular acts. The statistical studies showing racial
disparities in sentencing were discarded as irrelevant to the individualized determination of justice. 17 Even more telling was the Court's revealing statement in a footnote that "[e]ven a sophisticated multipleregression analysis ...can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of
race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily
lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision."58
In other words, the risk of racial discrimination, in and of itself, was
simply not enough.
Defendants claiming racial disparities in noncapital sentencing
have fared no better.5 9 After all, if the gravity of capital punishment
54 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring discriminatory intent for equal protection claims).
55 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Wayte v. United

States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
56 Id. at 292-93.
57 Lower courts' treatment of racial disparities in capital sentences for rape prior to Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which abolished the death penalty for rape, further demonstrates the
legal culture of particularity. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 146-47 (8th Cir. 1968)
(Blackmun, J.) (focusing on the aggravating factors in the particular case and downplaying statistical disparities); State v. Mayo, 87 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1956) (denying relief despite statistics
showing that over a twenty-year period only one white man but twenty-three black men were
sentenced to death for rape). See generally Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Rape, Racial
Discriminationand the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 99,
107-18 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976) (discussing empirical findings of
racial disparities in capital rape sentencing from 1945 to 1965).
Despite the culture of particularity, the disturbing ramifications of statistical studies became
increasingly apparent to jurists in the early 196os. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the
Conference: Re: CapitalPunishment, October Term 1963, 27 S.TEX. L. REV. 493, 504 n.!7 (1986);
see also Michael Meltsner, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 28-29 (I973). In fact, although Coker was ultimately decided on Eighth Amendment grounds and did not address racial concerns, such considerations were clearly in the background. See McCleskey, 48! U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although the [Coker] Court
did not explicitly mention race, the decision had to have been informed by the specific observations on rape by both the Chief Justice and Justice Powell in Furman.").
58 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.
S9 See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1995) (discounting racial disparities
among prosecutorial requests for life sentences for repeat drug offenders due to the potential presence of other permissible explanatory factors). See generally Developments in the Law-Race and
the Criminal Process, 1o HARV. L. REV. 1472, 630-35 (1987) [hereinafter Developments] (tying
disparities in noncapital sentencing to discriminatory parole board decisions). A well-known controversy about racial disparities in noncapital sentencing involves the Sentencing Guidelines'
treatment of crack versus powder cocaine. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). The crack/powder cocaine issue, however, is different from
the one addressed in this Note. This Note addresses racial disparities that remain after regression
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has not moved courts to consider statistical evidence, why would noncapital sentencing? Courts have predictably relied on the particularity
requirement to deny discrimination claims, focusing especially on remedial difficulties. 60 As Judge Clark acknowledged in the lower
court's consideration of McCleskey, even if racial bias randomly arose
in twenty percent of all convictions, judges could not simply overturn
showing of discrimination in a specific
them all. 61 Without a direct
62
done.
be
could
little
case,

Prosecution. - As in the sentencing context, defendants have
rarely, if ever, brought successful claims for racially discriminatory
prosecution. 63 Indeed, defendants have rarely succeeded in making
any selective prosecution claim at all. 64 In denying relief, courts have
focused less on a particular defendant's acts (as in the sentencing context) and more on the defendant's inability to show that prosecutors
purposefully caused the racial disparities. 6 Only when the statistical
disparities have been outrageous enough to make purposeful discrimination a virtual certainty have courts granted relief.
For example, in the only recent Supreme Court case dealing with
alleged racially discriminatory prosecution, United States v. Armstrong,66 the defendant argued that black crack-cocaine offenders were
2.

accounts for possible race-neutral factors, while the other inquiry focuses on a disparate impact
argument that disregards whether race may be merely correlated with a particular race-neutral
trait (for example, crack cocaine use).
60 See infra Part II.
61 McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 927 (ixth Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Clark, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) ("The societal imperative of maintaining a criminal justice system
... would outweigh the mandate that race or other prejudice not infiltrate the legal process.").
Judge Clark's dissent, however, distinguished capital sentencing, in which any racial discrimination was impermissible, from noncapital sentencing, which was subject to this pragmatic consideration. See id.
62 See id.
63 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 354 n.* (x997) (arguing that no
American court has ever found a prosecutor to have engaged in racially selective prosecution).
Concededly, besides the one in Armstrong, statistical studies for discriminatory prosecution have
thus far been relatively unsophisticated and episodic. See, e.g., U.S. v. Figueroa-Rocha, No. CRat *3 (N.D. Cal. April 27, 1995) (addressing raw numerical dis94 -2010 3 -JW, 1995 WL 253050,
parities in the enforcement of an immigration law); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 55-56 (1998) (implying
that a rigorous statistical study would be necessary for credible evaluation of prosecutorial practices). Given the high cost of such studies and the Court's unwillingness to rely on them even in
death penalty cases, such a result is unsurprising.
64 See McAdams, supra note 32, at 66 n.55.
65 See, e.g.,.Butler v. Cooper, 554 F.2d 645, 647 ( 4 th Cir. 1977) (denying relief despite studies
showing that eighty-four percent of persons arrested for violating liquor laws were black in a
county with only a thirty-three percent black population). But cf State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834,
840-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (allowing statistical disparities to establish a colorable
claim of discrimination and thus permitting discovery).
66 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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disproportionately tried under harsher federal laws. 6
Statistics revealed that every one of the twenty-four federal crack cocaine cases
tried by the local federal defenders office involved black defendants,
and affidavits suggested that white offenders had been tried only in
state court, in which penalties were considerably lighter.68 Based on
this evidence, the district court granted the defendant discovery of the
prosecution's records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
evidence failed to show that "similarly situated individuals of a differ69 and thus that the evidence was insufent race were not prosecuted,"
70
ficient to warrant discovery.
3. Policing. - Even if explicit racial profiling were to be found
unconstitutional, 71 similar doctrinal problems would hinder redress of
discriminatory police practices. For example, studies report that a disproportionate number of minority motorists are pulled over while acting no differently than their white counterparts.7 2 Despite the danger
73
of facilitating this practice, the Court in Whren v. United States
nonetheless validated pretextual stops and searches of cars under the
Fourth Amendment. 4 In addition, under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 75 to obtain an injunction against a discriminatory police practice,
a plaintiff must show a high likelihood that he in particular will be injured again.7 6 Thus, the particularity requirement once again presents
a sizeable obstacle to relief for targeted groups.

67

Id. at 458-59.

68

Id. at 459-61.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 470.

69
70
71

Racial profiling remains a controversial issue, and a number of commentators deny its constitutionality. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2006-07 (I998) (suggesting that the use by many police departments of statistical profiles in which race is a factor is likely unconstitutional). The difficulty of determining
the constitutionality of racial profiling is closely linked to the difficulty posed by disparate impact
theories. See supra p. 2103. To the extent that certain minority groups may on average commit a
greater percentage of certain crimes, profiling is strictly speaking "rational," but other societal
values may make such stereotyping impermissible or undesirable. Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 41o (199i) (rejecting the use of race as a proxy for bias in the peremptory challenge context).
See generally KENNEDY, supra note 63, at 136-67 (discussing the rationality, but undesirability,
of using race as a proxy).
72 See David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Trqffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 56x-69 (1997) (detailing
studies in Florida, Maryland, Illinois, and Colorado).
73 517 U.S. 806 (x996).
74 See id. at 81o, 813 (acknowledging the danger of racially discriminatory pretextual searches
but holding that the applicable provision is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment).
75 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
76 Id. at 1o5-o6; see also id. at I11-12 (cautioning judicial restraint when interfering with state
law enforcement in the absence of a substantial risk of irreparable injury). The Court has applied
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL RISK AND THE REMEDY PROBLEM

The shortcomings of the traditional particularized harm requirement can be ameliorated by a greater focus on and acknowledgment of
constitutional risks. Drawing from the mass tort context, this shift can
be achieved in two ways: Rather than viewing risk as an irremediable
possibility of harm, one can view risk as a remediable harm in itself.77
Or, one may presume that, given a large enough population, what is
traditionally "only" a risk is statistically certain to materialize into an
"actual" harm:78 yet because the actual manifestation of harm may be
difficult to locate, one may prefer to empower third parties or private
attorneys general for enforcement purposes.
These alternatives are essentially two sides of the same coin, but
this Note pursues only the first.7 9 Seeing risk as a remediable harm in
itself fits well with the current individualistic conception of causation.
In addition, by characterizing risk as injury in fact, one can address
constitutional risks while avoiding doctrinal standing obstacles.8 0
Conceptualizing constitutional risks as remediable harms would
address the racial disparity concerns raised in section I.C.8 ' Greater
acceptance of statistical evidence would better enable courts to see potential patterns of discrimination and to assess whether certain aspects
of the criminal process are structured appropriately to minimize dissimilar principles to discriminatory prosecution. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-99
(1974).
77 See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 481, 485- 8 6 (Wash.
1983) (Pearson, J., concurring); see also NOZICK, supra note 26, at 75-77 (discussing various
methods of compensating risk); cf. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353, 1364 (ig81) (advocating "[a] more rational approach ...[that] would allow recovery for the
loss of the chance of cure even though the chance was not better than even").
78 See Rosenberg, supra note i, at 884-87; cf. John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of
American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 701-04 (2001) (recounting the changes in the law of unintentional
torts that resulted from statistically inevitable industrial accidents).
79 By conceiving of risks as harms, the law must, as a practical matter, deal only with "substantial" risks to prevent an explosion of claims. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476 (suggesting that
courts may need to limit recovery to "significant" risks). The line between "de minimis" risks and
"substantial" risks is drawn as a matter of policy, just like the one delimiting "proximate" cause.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., x62 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); NOZICK, supra note 26, at 76-77 & n.*.
80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1464-66 (1988) (explaining why the question of standing rests substantially on the
characterization of the relevant injury).
81 On a theoretical level, the systemic and aggregative approach of a constitutional risk perspective may also be more consistent with equal protection than is the particularity approach.
Although the battle against racism has perhaps traditionally had a more individualistic tone, emphasizing each person as an individual and not as a stereotype, the concept of equal protection
itself invites comparisons on a systemwide basis. It invites comparisons among sentences, prosecutions, and traffic stops. It invites an examination of whether justice is equally distributed.
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crimination. At a minimum, a constitutional risk perspective would
ensure that courts recognize the problem of discrimination in the
criminal justice system.8 2 Even if an effective court-imposed remedy
were unavailable, acceptance of statistical evidence in the courts would
impress the problem of discrimination on both government actors and
the public at large.
Ideally, however, constitutional rights should be enforceable by
adequate remedies.8 3 Thus, the principal difficulty with achieving judicial acceptance of the constitutional risk perspective will be finding
effective but appropriately cabined remedies.8 4 As the remainder of
this Part demonstrates, the traditional remedy for constitutional violations (reversal or dismissal) seems ill suited to address constitutional
risks, as does the more activist remedy of a structural injunction. The
solution rests instead with tweaking the equal protection right itself to
create a requirement of procedural safeguards.
A. Sanctions
r. Dismissal - Dismissal or reversal8 has ordinarily been the
remedy used to redress constitutional violations in the criminal process.8 6 A substantial problem with dismissal remedies, however, is the
oft-heard complaint that they are windfalls to defendants.8 7 Defendants are freed not because they are innocent, but rather because of
some problem in the criminal system itself. For this reason, although
equal protection challenges in the criminal law context are perhaps
more in need of redress for reasons of legitimacy and justice, they are
more difficult to vindicate than those in other contexts. Unlike in
other contexts, in which claimants are at least occasionally sympathetic, in the criminal context the claimant is nearly always a con82 Acknowledging constitutional risks will invariably require greater use and acceptance of
statistics, and therefore courts may have to develop greater familiarity with and expertise in this
area. As in other fields, however, the use of statistics and probability should be unremarkable. In
the natural sciences, scientists often resort to statistics and probability to describe the physical
world when a system becomes too complex to model using cause and effect relationships. Described by some as a "mathematical theory of ignorance," when one cannot follow the behavior of
every particle or actor in a system, science settles for describing it holistically through the use of
statistics. See MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS IN WESTERN CULTURE 340-58 (x953).
83 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
84 See Karlan, supra note 71, at 2029 (suggesting that the problems regarding equal protection
and the criminal justice system are "as much about remedies as about rights").
85 Reversal remedies, however, are inappropriate for constitutional risks because the harm involved is systemic and therefore will persist even in a retrial.
86 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 348 (,987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 n.2 (x996) (noting that the Court has not yet ruled
on the appropriate remedy for discriminatory prosecution).
87 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 646
(x996).
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victed defendant. Courts therefore unsurprisingly tend to narrow the
88
circumstances under which a defendant can obtain a reversal.
Some might argue that the importance of vindicating equal protection rights in the criminal justice system justifies the social costs of releasing or retrying guilty defendants. Because defendants have the
greatest incentive to monitor the system, they are needed as private attorneys general to deter state actors from unconstitutional behavior.8 9
Nevertheless, the suitability of a private-attorney-general system in the
constitutional risk context does not necessarily follow from its acceptance in the traditional context of proven, particularized discrimination. The right-remedy gap is even more pronounced when the harms
suffered are constitutional risks - traditional harms discounted by
probability. If dismissal for racially motivated prosecution of an otherwise guilty bank robber is already disproportionate, then dismissal
when there was only a risk of racially motivated prosecution is even
more problematic.
Constitutional risk presents an even more serious problem for dismissal remedies. Unlike the traditional particularized harm regime, a
constitutional risk regime cannot limit dismissal to a small class of defendants. Because constitutional risk acknowledges a systemic problem, it would make dismissals available to all future defendants, calling into question the entire criminal justice system.9 0 This kind of
wide-ranging reductio argument weighed heavily in McCleskeyY 1
2. Rebuttable Presumptions.- One solution to the dismissal problem would be to allow constitutional risks to create a rebuttable preWhen a defendant demonsumption of constitutional infirmity.92
88 See Karlan, supra note 71, at 2005 (suggesting that concerns about the dismissal remedy led
the Court to use the intent standard to eviscerate equal protection doctrine in the area of selective
prosecution).
89 For a general discussion on the usefulness of granting windfalls to private attorneys general
to enforce constitutional provisions, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring ConstitutionalViolations by
Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 247 (j988).

90 Cf Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 n.15 (xg8i) (Brennan, J., concurring) (acknowledging that if "less than 63 square feet of cell space per inmate were a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment, then approximately two-thirds of all federal, state and local inmates today
would be unconstitutionally confined").
91 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 (expressing concern that McCleskey's claim "would extend
to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant [was]
black"); id. at 314-15 (expressing concern that McCleskey's capital sentencing claim could easily
be extended to all other types of penalty); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 927 (xith
Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that even if racial bias randomly arose in twenty
percent of noncapital convictions, federal courts could not realistically strike down all prosecutions).
92 In the aftermath of McCleskey, Congress considered allowing statistical proof to establish
such a presumption in capital sentencing cases, but the bill ultimately failed. See Racial Justice
Act of 1989, S. 1696, iolst Cong. § 2922(bXI) (i989); cf KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(3), (5)
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strates an otherwise inexplicable racial disparity, a constitutional violation would be presumed unless the government could produce a neutral explanation for its behavior. Such presumptions have often been
used in the jury selection and school segregation contexts. 93 Critics
may argue, however, that such rebuttable presumptions create costly
burdens on law enforcement and prosecutors given their limited resources, especially if the collection of statistical and other data justifying racial disparities is costly and difficult.
In addition, a rebuttable presumption still presupposes the existence of a particularized wrongdoer who can provide a race-neutral
explanation. In the criminal justice system, such explanations are often unavailable. For example, jury deliberations are strictly confidential, making an allegation of racial discrimination impossible to rebut.
In these instances, the rebuttable presumption would be no different
than dismissal.
On the flip side, small sample sizes make race-neutral explanations
impossible to refute. Even if juries had open deliberations, they still
convict and sentence only once, and individual prosecutors try few
cases with similar factual situations. In such circumstances, these actors can easily rationalize potentially discriminatory conduct by giving
race-neutral explanations.9 4 Rebuttable presumptions would therefore
fail to remedy the constitutional risk.
3. Discovery. - Another alternative would be to grant discovery
requests by defendants who raise plausible statistical claims, but to
leave the burden of proof on them. "[M]ost of the relevant proof in selective prosecution cases will normally be in the Government's
hands,"95 so discovery will provide additional data for defendants
seeking to satisfy the traditional requirement of discriminatory pur96
pose. Armstrong, of course, rejected precisely this discovery remedy,
but that decision arguably rested on the Court's particularized view of
harm: because Armstrong had proven no harm in his particular case,
(Michie x999) (allowing a defendant to use statistics to prove racial discrimination by clear and
convincing evidence).
93 E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (peremptory challenges); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (197) (previously segregated school district); see
Sklansky, supra note 59, at 1318.
94 This problem is one of the reasons that the rule against race-based peremptory challenges
under Batson has essentially been eviscerated. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448,
1454-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (permitting peremptory challenges to three potential jurors with Hawaiian
surnames for race-neutral reasons such as lack of attentiveness, financial hardship, and having
long hair and a beard); see also Karlan, supra note 71, at 2021 & nn.96-ioi (reporting explanations such as weight, handwriting, clothing, and attitude).
95 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (996) (rejecting discovery for, inter alia, its
possible chilling effect on law enforcement and its potential to reveal the government's enforcement policy).
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he was not entitled to discovery. Were the Court to recognize constitutional risk as an actual harm, one could imagine the Court being more
inclined to grant a discovery "sanction."9 7
Although granting discovery on the basis of constitutional risk
would be an improvement over the present Armstrong doctrine, discovery too suffers from reliance on particularized wrongdoers. Discovery is only useful to defendants if the information discovered can
prove intent, but short of finding the proverbial "smoking gun," discovery will likely provide only more statistical data, and little will be
gained. And as precedent suggests, only in extreme cases will courts
infer intent solely from statistical disparities. 98
4. ProportionalRemedies. - Within the realm of compensatory
remedies, constitutional risk faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is
unclear what remedy other than dismissal or a sentence reduction
would provide sufficient incentive for a defendant "to ferret out racial
discrimination." 99 On the other hand, dismissal is an overly generous
remedy for constitutional risk. Constitutional risk varies by degrees the harm inflicted depends on the magnitude of the risk. Dismissal,
however, is a binary remedy - either a defendant escapes conviction
or he does not. Dismissal is thus a windfall because it cannot be discounted to fit varying levels of harm.
This mismatch between harm and remedy exists at most stages of
the criminal process: decisions to prosecute, convict, or sentence to
death are all binary. But at some stages, such as noncapital sentencing, differences of degree do exist, theoretically allowing courts to discount for uncertainty. As in the tort context, courts could discount
what would otherwise be full compensation by awarding proportional
remedies. 100 More specifically, if a statistical study (having sufficiently
accounted for all nonracial explanatory factors) were to demonstrate
97 Cf.McAdams, supra note 32, at 658 (arguing that discovery is a useful sanction because it is
costly to prosecutors and is an intermediate remedy); Anne Bowen Poulin, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Selective Prosecution,34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. o7i, xogo-98 (1997) (arguing for discovery
as a form of "soft enforcement"). However, although discovery may impose costs on government
actors and deter unconstitutional conduct, it is not a "true" sanction. Unless a reasonable opportunity for ultimate dismissal accompanies discovery, defendants will lack the adequate incentives
to bring claims.

See supra note S.
99 Karlan, supra note 71, at 2028. Civil damages, the common law remedy for rights violations, seem unhelpful to defendants facing death or incarceration, and defendants also face barriers such as prosecutorial immunity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), and unsympathetic juries, see Karlan, supra note 71, at 2012.
100 Professor William J. Stuntz suggested this insight in private conversation. Cf.Herskovits v.
Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 487 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring)
(suggesting a discount of full compensatory damages to reflect the level of risk imposed by the
wrongdoer); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 867 (same). For a related discussion in the context of
verdicts, see Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CAL. L.
98

REV. 231 (2O01).
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that the average black defendant received a twenty-five percent
greater prison sentence for a particular crime than did the average
white defendant, then courts could simply reduce a black defendant's
sentence by twenty-five percent. Because all black defendants could
prove this risk, they would all receive the twenty-five percent reduction. No overdeterrence or windfall would result,10 1 and the compen10 2
sation would be directly proportional to the imposed risk.

Courts

might therefore be more amenable to granting proportional relief for
claims of constitutional risk.
Despite the possible benefits of a proportional remedy, this alternative suffers from a number of significant difficulties, the most obvious
of which is that it amounts to a race-based remedy. Only defendants
of the race at risk would receive reduced sentences, a situation that
raises grave political and equal protection concerns.10 3 Another serious
problem is that proportional remedies may undermine public acceptance of court decisions.' 0 4 Observers could find the remedy strange
and the message ambiguous: courts would recognize the existence of
racial discrimination, but rather than develop doctrines to deter or stop
equal protection violations, they would merely cut the baby in half.
B. Structural Injunctions
One might view the mismatch between dismissal and constitutional
risk as the predictable result of applying old fixes to new contexts.
The constitutional risk perspective addresses systemic, not particularized harm. So although a traditional remedy may be preferable to advocates of judicial restraint, a more systemic remedy may be necessary.
If the goal is systemic change, then structural injunctions seemingly
provide a ready answer. If the system creates constitutional risk, then
why not require changes in the system? Rather than take the circuitous route of granting windfalls to guilty defendants to deter government discrimination and to eliminate racial disparities, courts could
simply mandate an end to inexplicable racial disparities. 10 s For exam101 Prosecutors could not overcharge minority defendants to compensate for the sentencing discount, because such overcharging would itself theoretically exacerbate racial disparities that
would justify greater proportional compensation in the future.
102 See Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 881-85.
103 See Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4 th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts

should employ race-based remedies only as a "last-resort" because "the use of race as a reparational device risks perpetuating the very race-consciousness such a remedy purports to overcome").
104 Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proofand the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1382-84 (1985) (explaining how "proportionate awards" may

undermine attempts to shape behavior).
105 Cf Chayes, supra note ig, at 1292-96 (noting the rise of injunctions and other equitable relief in public law litigation).
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pie, an injunction could require the ratcheting up of arrests and prosecutions of whites until the disparities disappeared.106
A structural remedy, however, faces substantial obstacles. First, injunctions cannot realistically address jury discrimination because juries are one-time actors and because direct interference with their deliberations would raise Sixth Amendment concerns. 10 7 Second, unlike
injunctions in the prison or school context, injunctions forcing increased prosecutions provide no benefit, and therefore no incentive, to
defendants. 0 Third, as a race-based remedy, a "ratchet-up" injunction would itself raise equal protection problems. In fact, it would be
far worse than proportional remedies because government actors
would explicitly use race to target individuals for prosecution. 10 9
C. DiscretionaryGuidelines
Remedies can be arranged along a spectrum of increasing judicial
activism. At one end, sanctions, representing more passive remedies,
use deterrence to influence other branches of government indirectly.
At the other end, structural injunctions are far more active and impose
judicially desired results directly. Both have significant drawbacks in
combating constitutional risks, leading one to search for a middleground solution that would address structural defects with minimal intrusiveness. A possible compromise would have courts sanction the
government not for imposing constitutional risks, but for failing to
minimize them through structural safeguards.

106 Courts could also use a "ratchet-up" injunction to address race-of-the-victim discrimination.
See Kennedy, supra note io, at 1390-91.
107 Cf. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, io9 HARv. L. REV. 355, 420 (1995) (arguing that a "ratchet-up" is unavailable to enforce equality in capital sentencing because courts
cannot compel decisionmakers to impose that penalty).
108 Presumably, interest groups could take up the mantle, but only if they successfully overcame
third-party standing obstacles.
109 Structural injunctions also implicate concerns about judicial intrusiveness, which often explain the great reluctance of courts to impose them. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution,85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1797-98 (987) (discussing the McCleskey Court's reluctance to undertake a "wholesale restructuring" of the system); see
also TRIBE, supra note 42, § 16-2o, at isio (suggesting that the Court's use of the discriminatory
intent standard in equal protection cases stems from a "trepidation about embracing the highly
intrusive structural remedies that may be required to root out the entrenched results of racial subjugation'). By interfering with prosecutorial decisions, the judiciary meddles in a traditionally
exclusive province of the executive branch, see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978), and an area in which it is institutionally ill suited to make decisions, see, e.g., Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). Sentencing may be a more appropriate area for judicial
intervention. See Sklansky, supra note 59, at 1316 (arguing that criminal sentencing is "close to
the core" of the judiciary's competence). But even in the sentencing context it is unclear whether
appellate courts are well suited to such fact-based inquiries.
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r. Reining In Discretion. - Discretion is often at the root of discrimination. 1" 0 Theoretically, given a facially race-neutral statute, no
discrimination could occur if government actors had an obligation to
arrest, prosecute, and sentence everyone in exactly the same way. Discretion, however, is inevitable in practice: rules have gaps;' 1 ' discretion
is often desirable in contexts such as sentencing that involve complex
judgment calls;" 2 and broad criminal statutes coupled with limited resources make the prosecution of all crimes impossible." 3 But the fact
that discretion is inevitable does not mean that it must be unbridled.
reCourts and legislatures can restrain discretion with guidelines and
14
cord-keeping requirements that reduce the risk of discrimination.
The existence of an unexplained racial disparity - a constitutional
risk - suggests that the criminal justice system may be according
government actors too much discretion. If one accepts this assertion,
then the racial disparities discussed in section I.C should come as little
surprise. Law enforcement, prosecutorial, and sentencing decisions are
generally governed by few guidelines"' and are often accompanied by
little or no record of their decisionmaking processes. Without records
or standards, appellate courts lack the tools for meaningful review of
discretion; such a scenario, in turn, opens the door to latent discrimination.
2. Guidelines and Record-keeping. - The above observation suggests a modification of equal protection doctrine in the context of con110 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
170 (Illini Books 1971) (x969) ("[T]he power to be lenient is the power to discriminate." (emphasis

omitted)). The concern over the link between discretion and discrimination is not new in criminal
law. It was a motivating factor for regulating grand jury selection, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 496-97 & n.I7 (i977), capital sentencing, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. I53, i88-9i
(1976), and federal sentencing more generally, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.
i, pt. A (2o00). Vagueness doctrine arguably also aims at preventing excessive police discretion
and its accompanying risk of impermissible classifications. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 71-72 (x999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing constitutional concerns about unlimited police discretion).
I1I See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994).
112 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(affirming the constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing in the death penalty
context); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 107, at 381-83 (discussing the tension between
discretion and nonarbitrariness in the death penalty context). In fact, a mandatory death penalty
may actually exacerbate unbridled jury discretion because it may invite jury nullification.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03.
113 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (i997).
114 See Vorenberg, supra note 43, at 1562-72.
115 See Davis, supra note 63, at 35 n.io6 (reporting that "Washington is the only state with
[statutory prosecutorial] guidelines"). The Sentencing Guidelines constrain sentencing discretion
at the federal level, but the same cannot be said for all state sentencing. See Michael Tonry,
7venty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 170
(ig9) (reporting that, as of 1995, more than twenty states had guidelines).
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stitutional risk: if a defendant demonstrates a racial disparity for
which no legitimate explanation exists, a court could grant dismissal
unless the government could show that it had adopted decisionmaking
guidelines' 1 6 and, where possible, required decisionmaking records." 7
In effect, statistical disparities would create a presumption of discrimination, but to rebut the presumption, the government would need only
demonstrate that it has adopted procedural safeguards that limit discretion and the concomitant risk of discrimination.' 1 8 This test, which
combines statistical and structural elements, is reminiscent of the doctrine dealing with jury discrimination in Castaneda v. Partida,"9
which held that, when a jury selection procedure is susceptible to
abuse, a significant racial disparity is sufficient to establish an equal
protection violation. 120 The Court has subsequently attempted to confine Castaneda to the jury context,' 2' but there is no a priori reason
22
not to extend it to constitutional risks.
From a doctrinal standpoint, any judicially created requirements of
record-keeping and guidelines would be essentially prophylactic rules
to minimize constitutional risks. 23 Courts might impose these requirements with varying degrees of specificity depending on the success of early interventions. The substantive details of the guidelines
would likely be left to state legislatures because of their polycentric,
policy-based nature. 2 4 If ultimately unsatisfied, however, courts could

116 Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 365 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (advocating the
use of "guidelines" for prosecutorial discretion in the death penalty context).
117 Record-keeping may not be possible, for example, in the jury context, given strongly held
traditions regarding the secrecy of deliberations.
118 Cf. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 ('999) (allowing an employer to
evade punitive damages for workplace sexual harassment if the employer has an antiharassment
policy and a grievance mechanism in place).
119 430 U.S. 482 (1977).

120 Id. at 494-95. Although the Castaneda elements create only a presumption of discrimination, id., in the context of multiple actors the presumption is very difficult to refute.
121 Cf. Sklansky, supra note 59, at 1311 (implying that the Court has largely confined Castaneda
to the jury context).
122 See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 502 (Marshall, J., concurring) (suggesting that, at least as of
1977, a statistical disparity and discretionary selection procedures always established a prima facie case of discrimination); Kennedy, supra note zo, at 142 7-29 (criticizing McCleskey's distinction
of capital sentencing from grand jury selection as "unpersuasive"); see also Developments, supra
note 59, at 155 2-54 (suggesting a modified version of the scheme proposed in this Note).
123 See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. i9o
(x988) (observing that constitutional law is replete with prophylactic rules).
124 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404
(1978) (suggesting that legislatures are the institutions most competent to make decisions that
carry multiple and complex repercussions involving many actors). This partnership between
courts and state legislatures would parallel the Supreme Court's intervention in capital sentencing
in the 1970s. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (4976)(plurality opinion).
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offer certain procedures as safe harbors or even as constitutional requirements. 2 '
The requirements of guidelines and record-keeping accomplish four
important goals. First, guidelines constrain discretion by providing a
decisionmaking framework. Concededly, guidelines cannot eliminate
all racism in the criminal process, but they can at least minimize it by
126
reducing the range of discretion available to government actors.
Second, record-keeping and guidelines create greater transparency,
forcing government actors to make reasoned justifications and deterring them from using impermissible factors.' 27 Third, decisionmaking
standards and records provide appellate courts with the necessary
tools for meaningful review. 1 28 Indeed, even if appellate courts are ill
suited for reviewing executive discretion,1 29 the mere threat of review
has normative value and may alter behavior.130 Finally, the implementation of guidelines benefits all defendants equally - unlike structural
injunctions and proportional remedies, it is not a race-based remedy.
3. Potential Concerns. - Discretionary guidelines do, however,
have some inherent drawbacks. Naturally, they limit prosecutorial
discretion, which the Court has recognized as essential in a resourceconstrained world. 13 1 Guidelines also limit the ability of all actors in
the system - police, prosecutors, and judges - to dispense individualized justice. 32 The problem is that catering to the individual case
12S Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (suggesting a safe-harbor procedure that would satisfy Fifth Amendment requirements but encouraging legislatures to develop
their own solutions), with Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332-36 (2000) (interpreting
Miranda as announcing a constitutionally mandated prophylactic rule).
126 But see Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 478-8, (iggg) (noting that despite the
Department of Justice's elaborate death penalty review process, federal death sentencing exhibits
even greater racial disparities than state death sentencing).
127 If government actors remained undeterred, such records could be used for further litigation.
See Harris, supra note 72, at 566 (reporting the statistical evidence of racial disparities that Maryland police generated after a settlement required greater record-keeping of certain traffic stops).
128 See Strauss, supra note 123, at 196 (suggesting that "clear standards make it easier for a
court reviewing the official's action to determine if it was influenced by an impermissible consideration"); cf. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (198o)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing the need for intelligible principles to facilitate judicial review of administrative decisions).
129 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
130 For example, the constitutional ban on race-based peremptory challenges established by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, oo (x986), may be a paper tiger, see supra note 94, but its
"shadow effects" arguably have tangible value. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, go COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112 (iggo) (arguing that clear statement rules and the
nondelegation doctrine operate as "second-best surrogatels]" in light of the "intrusiveness and unwieldiness" of large-scale judicial review).
131 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 6o8-o9 (1985).
132 Cf., e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 314 n.37 (987) (declaring "discretion essential to
a humane and fair system of criminal justice").
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necessarily undermines the uniformity of legal rules. 133 Mercy may
temper justice, but mercy requires discretion, and discretion allows
discrimination.1 34 Thus, the best one can hope to achieve is a balance,1 35 and by retaining but narrowing discretion, discretionary
guidelines reduce the risk of discrimination while preserving a modicum of individualized justice.
More fundamentally, critics may ask whether courts, as compared
to legislatures, are the appropriate institutions to implement systemic
changes. 136 Legislatures, however, have perverse incentives to draft
overinclusive criminal statutes and to defer to prosecutors: broad
criminalization maximizes politically popular "law and order" rhetoric,
and extensive prosecutorial discretion minimizes legislatures' blame for
perceived miscarriages of justice.' 37 In addition, discretionary guidelines are not nearly as intrusive as the structural injunctions described
in section II.B. A prophylactic rule requiring discretionary guidelines
would mandate only that legislatures constrain discretion, either by
legislating directly or by delegating the authority to develop guidelines
to police, prosecutors, and trial courts. 13 8 A guidelines approach to
constitutional risk would leave considerable leeway for local officials to
develop their own systems to limit discretion. Only in the face of consistent failure would the judiciary need to increase its involvement.
And even if courts shunned more intrusive measures as overly activist,
the mere recognition of the problem might spur other branches to de39
velop appropriate remedies.'

133 See Callins v. Collins, 51o U.S. 1141, 1144 (x994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and
discrimination from the administration of death can never be achieved without compromising an
equally essential component of fundamental fairness - individualized sentencing." (citation omitted)).

134 Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 107, at 391 (explaining how standardless consideration of

mitigating evidence makes discrimination possible in death penalty sentencing).
135 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 n.35 (discussing the essential need to balance uniformity and

discretion).
136 See id. at 319 (maintaining that legislatures are the appropriate institutions).
137 See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 15-19 (x996).
138 Cf Strauss, supra note 123, at 200--01 (defending Miranda's prophylactic rule as less judi-

cially imperialistic than rigid overbreadth doctrines in the First Amendment context because it
allows for legislative alternatives).
139 For example, instead of courts imposing prophylactic rules, Congress could legislate guidelines that were "congruent and proportional" to the harms involved. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 530-33 (1997);

TRIBE, supra note 42, § 16-2o, at 1514 n.97 (speculating that

McCleskey left room for Congress to regulate, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
state death penalty procedures that discriminate against racial minorities).
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III. CONCLUSION

This Note has examined the consequences of a shift in the equal
protection context - a move from a traditional particularized harm
perspective to a constitutional risk perspective focused on systemic
harms. It has also acknowledged the significant remedial difficulties
associated with constitutional risk, but by focusing on discretion as the
source of most equal protection risks, this Note has proposed a moderate doctrinal change: discretionary safeguards.
To be sure, this Note leaves the project substantially incomplete.
Constitutional risk's focus on statistical evidence requires careful discussion of the pitfalls judges face in this area and of how they can develop expertise in response. Additionally, because one need not confine the constitutional risk perspective to equal protection, it may
usefully be extended to inform other constitutional doctrines, such as
facial challenges and prophylactic rules. 140 In extending constitutional
risk, however, one should remember that shifting to a risk-based view
of constitutional law represents a genuine policy decision. Never have
laws protected every individual against every risk - to do so is neither
practical nor possible. Therefore, one must determine which risks are
substantial enough to warrant a remedy. Even more crucially, one
must decide if constitutional risk is a transsubstantive doctrine, or
whether only some constitutional harms are serious enough to require
a more systemic and nuanced look.' 41 All this remains for another
day.

140 A cursory examination reveals that the idea of constitutional risk may be latent in many
areas of constitutional law. For example, one can view overbreadth doctrine and some facial challenges not as redressing actual harm (as in the case of an as-applied challenge), but as removing a
risk of constitutional harm from the plaintiff's environment. The same is true for prophylactic
rules, which address not constitutional harms ex post, but the risk of future constitutional harms
ex ante. See Strauss, supra note 123, at 198-200 (suggesting that levels of constitutional scrutiny
are in effect prophylactic rules).
141 Cf.Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and FacialChallenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 132 1, 1342-56 (2000) (arguing that facial challenge doctrine is not transsubstantive
but rather reflects specific doctrinal tests).
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